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Afton Titus*

Domestic Revenue Mobilizaton through
Corporate Income Tax in an East African
Developing Country Context

The laudable objective of making the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) a
reality requires the targeted use of financial resources. It has become imperative for
governments to raise such financial resources through mechanisms that facilitate
the domestic mobilization of revenues. This paper argues that in an African
developing country context, corporate income tax represents the most effective
means by which governments may raise the required funds. Corporate income
tax remains an important source of revenue for African countries. This paper
further proposes: (i) the design of the essential features of a corporate income tax
system that properly accounts for the economy within which it is to operate;(ii) the
appropriate policy decisions that are to be made to achieve specified government
objectives; and (iii) the administrative capacity challenges that must be addressed
to ensure its effective implementation. In so doing, it is envisaged that the SDGs
may become an achievable goal for developing countries, rather than a mere hope.
L’entreprise louable de faire des objectifs de développement durable (ODD)
une réalité nécessite une utilisation ciblée de ressources financières. Il est
devenu impératif pour les gouvernements de lever ces ressources financières
par le biais de mécanismes qui facilitent la mobilisation nationale des revenus.
Cet article soutient que dans le contexte des pays africains en développement,
l’impôt sur les sociétés représente le moyen le plus efficace pour permettre aux
gouvernements de réunir les fonds nécessaires. L’impôt sur les sociétés reste
une source importante de revenus pour les pays africains. Ce document propose
en outre : (i) la conception des caractéristiques essentielles d’un système d’impôt
sur les sociétés qui tienne correctement compte de l’économie dans laquelle il
doit fonctionner; (ii) les décisions politiques appropriées qui doivent être prises
pour atteindre les objectifs gouvernementaux spécifiés; et (iii) les défis de capacité
administrative qui doivent être relevés pour assurer sa mise en œuvre efficace. Ce
faisant, il est envisagé que les ODD puissent devenir réalisables pour les pays en
développement, plutôt qu’un simple espoir.
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Introduction
Global trade has increased, the world is more interconnected than ever
before, and the number of places on the planet that are truly remote is
growing smaller every day. However, developing countries still face
significant challenges in taking advantage of these global developments.
In recognition of these challenges, the United Nations in 2015 adopted
a programme that identified seventeen Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs). If realized, the gap between the developed and the developing
world would drastically reduce.
Setting aside the idealism attached to the SDGs, implementation and
achievement of the SDGs require significant financial resources. It was
noted at the Addis Ababa Financing for Development Conference in 2015
that the achievement of the SDGs would need a substantial increase in
financial resources, particularly revenues that have been domestically
mobilized.1
To understand how this may be done, it is necessary to place the SDGs
in the context of a developing country faced with the (perhaps uphill) task
1.
United Nations, “Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference
on Financing for Development (Addis Ababa Action Agenda), 69/313” (2015), online (pdf):
<sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2051AAAA_Outcome.pdf> [perma.cc/B4WXNQWF].
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of realizing its SDGs. In doing so, the author is cognizant of the fact that
the term “developing country” is an amorphous one. As such, the author
has identified a particular African developing country context that would
be appropriate for this discussion—that of the East African Federation.
The East African Federation is not yet in existence, but is a political
federation that the Partner States making up the East African Community
(EAC) aim to form in the near future. This East African Federation
provides a suitable test jurisdiction for evaluating the best way for
an African developing country to approach domestically mobilizing
revenues to realize its SDGs. The East African Federation is a suitable
context, despite its current non-existence, because it provides a clean slate
by which policy proposals may be made without the hindrance of already
embedded policy decisions that may distort the projected outcomes of
policy-related research.
Accordingly, this paper argues that the corporate income tax system
is an appropriate vehicle for increasing financial resources to enable the
East African Federation to meet its SDGs. It has been recognized that
corporate income tax continues to play a key role in the revenue-raising
ability of African developing countries, and this would be true for the East
African Federation as well.2 Given the importance of a suitably designed
corporate income tax system to African developing countries in general,
this paper joins a broader conversation about the tax policy issues facing
African developing countries today.

I. Methodology

This paper argues that the corporate income tax system is a fitting
mechanism for the East African Federation to increase financial resources
and finance government expenditure on plans to meet its SDGs. Focus is
placed on corporate income tax for the following reasons:
(a) Corporate income tax continues to be the most important revenueraising tool available to African governments.3 It is therefore more
likely to raise the required funds than other taxes.
(b) Corporate income tax is a flexible mechanism for meeting myriad
government policy objectives in a cost-effective manner.4
(c) From an administrative perspective, it is much easier for a government
to effectively tax corporates than individuals. This is because record2.
Anne W Oguttu, “Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting in Africa—Part 1: What Should Africa’s
Response Be to the OECD BEPS Action Plan?” (2015) 48:3 Comp & Intl LJ Afr 516 at 526.
3.
Ibid.
4.
Mark B Smith, “Chapter 1: Introduction” in The Taxing Road to Sustainable Growth, Resource
Productivity and Corporate Taxation (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2013) at 1.4.
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keeping of corporates is better than that of individuals, and it is easier
to locate and track corporates than individuals.5
(d) Since taxation is as much a political imperative as it is an economic
one, the taxation of corporates in a manner that is seen to be effective
would tie into the populist narrative that corporations should pay their
“fair share of taxes.”6 This would allow the East African Federation
to gain favour with the general population, and, in so doing, lend
credibility and legitimacy to its plan to finance SDG-building through
corporate income tax.
Moreover, a study conducted on domestic revenue mobilization and
the tax capacity, effort and gaps of a range of countries,7 indicates that a
country’s ability to raise revenue depends on the following three factors:
(a) The composition of the country’s economy;
(b) The policy choices made by the country; and
(c) The administrative capacity of the country.8
Accordingly, this paper follows a similar order. It details the EAC
context by setting out the corporate income tax positions of the EAC
Partner States, while also discussing the relevant drivers of the economy
in the East African region. This context is followed by a proposal of the
policy choices that the East African Federation may make in designing
a corporate income tax system that could assist in raising the financial
resources required to meet its SDG targets. Next, the administrative
capacity challenges facing the East African Federation are considered, and
proposals are made as to how some of these may be addressed.

II. Corporate Income Tax Design
1. The East African Community context
Three of the EAC Partner States have some of the highest economic
growth rates in the East African region—Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania—
while others exhibit some of the lowest—South Sudan and Burundi.9
5.
Richard M Bird, “Why Tax Corporations?” (2002) 56 Bull Intl Taxation 194 at 199.
6.
John Schoen, “Do Companies Pay “Fair Share”? Depends Whom You Ask” CNBC (21
September 2014), online: <www.cnbc.com/2014/09/21/axes-do-companies-pay-their-fair-share-oftaxes-depends-how-you-ask.html> [perma.cc/CJ3B-ZF46].
7.
Graham Glenday, Ipchita Bharali & Ziyuan Wang, “Enhancing Domestic Revenues: Constraints
and Opportunities—A cross country comparative study of tax capacity, effort and gaps” (2019), online
(pdf): Centre for Policy Impact in Global Health <centerforpolicyimpact.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/18/2019/04/CPIGH-Report_Tax-report_Enhancing-Domestic-Revenues__April-2019_FINAL.
pdf> [perma.cc/TM5B-9C5Y].
8.
Ibid at 11.
9.
“East Africa Economic Outlook 2019” (2019) at 2, online (pdf): African Development Bank
Group
<www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/2019AEO/REO_2019_-_
East_Africa_.pdf> [perma.cc/8TMV-9476].
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The main drivers for the strong economic growth in Kenya, Rwanda
and Tanzania are the service and agricultural sectors.10 Conversely, the
weak economic growth in Burundi and South Sudan is attributed to the
continuing political instability in the two countries.11 The extractive
industry also plays a significant role in the EAC Partner States, including
oil extraction in South Sudan and the recent discovery of natural gas and
oil in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.12 A further important element of the
EAC structural economic composition is the large informal sector in the
East African region, which plays a significant part in securing employment
opportunities for the youth in the region.13 In terms of economic risks
for the EAC, it is important to note the rising debt exposure that EAC
Partner States, such as Kenya, Tanzania and South Sudan, are undertaking
with respect to the finance provided to them by China.14 Notwithstanding
this, the East African region has produced good performance indicators,
with Rwanda ranked second in Africa of the 2017 World Bank’s Doing
Business Report.15 The East African region was also the biggest recipient
of foreign direct investment in Africa for 2017, with Kenya receiving the
most foreign direct investment projects.16
Given this understanding of the structural composition of the economy
in the EAC, it is useful to also analyze the manner in which the six Partner
States of the EAC tax corporate profits before considering a proposal
designed for the East African Federation. All six Partner States employ
the classic corporate income system in taxing corporate profits. The key
element of the classical corporate income tax system, as initially described
by Van den Tempel,17 is the tax treatment of companies as separate legal
entities, and the economic double taxation of dividends in the hands of
the companies and shareholders.18 Table 1 below indicates the budgetary
performance of this tax in the six Partner States for three financial years:
2015/16, 2016/17 and 2017/18.
10. Ibid at 1.
11. Ibid at 5.
12. Ibid at 2.
13. Ibid at 16.
14. Ibid at 8.
15. Doing Business 2017: Equal Opportunity for All, 14th ed (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017)
at 7.
16. “Turning Tides: EY Attractiveness Program Africa” (2018) at 16, online (pdf): Ernst & Young
<assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_za/topics/attractiveness/ey-turning-tides-2018.pdf>
[perma.cc/XP8J-RYE9].
17. AJ Van den Tempel, Corporation Tax and Individual Income Tax in the European Communities
(Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 1970).
18. Sijbren Cnossen, “Corporation Taxes in the European Union: Slowly Moving Toward
Comprehensive Business Income Taxation?” (2017) 25:3 Intl Tax & Public Finance 808 at 820.
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Table 1: Corporate Income Tax Performance in the EAC Partner States*
Country

Corporate
Income
Tax
2017/18

Corporate
Income
Tax
2018/19

Corporate
Income
Tax
2019/20

Percentage
of
Corporate
Tax to Total
Tax
2017/18

Percentage
of
Corporate
Tax to Total
Tax
2018/19

Percentage
of
Corporate
Tax to
Total Tax
2019/20

Kenya
(in KSh
billions)

278 133

339 186

416 172

43,42%

45,7%

47,06%

Rwanda
(in RWF
billions)

65 615

93 418

104 414

5.5%

6.9%

6.62%

South
Sudan
(in SSP
billions)

1 753

1 375

2 180

12,5%

6,05%

8,07%

Tanzania
(in Tsh
billions)

1 961

1 878

2 074

22%

17%

18%

Uganda
(in Shs
billions)

885

904

1 288

6%

6%

7%

*Author’s own calculations based on country budget information. Budget information for Burundi is
not currently available.

As Table 1 indicates, corporate income tax is more important to some
Partner States (such as Kenya) than others (such as Uganda). In terms
of trends, the collection of this tax has increased over the three-year
period in all Partner States (aside from South Sudan and Tanzania, which
both saw a slight dip in collections in the 2018/2019 fiscal year). This
trend of increasing collections is interesting because both Rwanda and
Kenya introduced corporate tax holidays over the 2015-2018 period as a
mechanism to encourage foreign direct investment.19 Rwanda has seen a
substantial increase in its collections over the three-year period.
The corporate income tax’s performance varied across the other
Partner States over the period. Despite the variance in performance, Table
1 indicates that corporate tax collection is an important source of revenue
across the EAC, as is the case in the rest of Africa.20
In terms of the collection of taxes, it has been noted that governments
should collect at fifteen per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) to

19. See Law Nº 006/2021 of 05/02/2021 on Investment Promotion And Facilitation (Rwanda),
Annex item I; Export Processing Zones Act, 1990 (Kenya), c 517, s 29.
20. Oguttu, supra note 2 at 526.
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adequately finance government functions.21 However, in terms of Table 2
below, aside from Kenya, all of the EAC Partner States have tax-to-GDP
ratios below fifteen per cent. In terms of the relation of these ratios to more
global averages, France has the highest tax-to-GDP ratio of the OECD
countries at 46.1 per cent while Mexico has the lowest at 16.1 per cent.22
Table 2: Tax-to-GDP Ratio for East African Community Partner States*
and selected OECD States**
Country

Most Recent Year
Available

Tax-to-GDP Ratio

Burundi

2013

13.5

Kenya

2017

15.7

Rwanda

2017

13.6

Not Available

Not Available

Tanzania

2018

11.6

Uganda

2017

13.7

France

2018

46.1

Mexico

2018

16.1

South Sudan

* Source: World Bank Data **Source: OECD Revenue Statistics 2019

According to the above table, Kenya has the highest tax-to-GDP ratio
of 15.7 per cent, while Tanzania has the lowest (in terms of reportable
data) of 11.6 per cent. This means that most of the EAC Partner States
are not collecting enough taxes to properly sustain government functions.
This has exacerbated the high debt exposure of the EAC Partner States as
mentioned earlier in this paper as the EAC Partner States use debt to fund
government expenditure.
The collection of corporate tax in the EAC Partner States must also
be considered against the general fiscal budget of the Partner States.
All of the Partner States have recorded a fiscal deficit for the 2018/2019
21.
22.

“East Coast Economic Outlook 2019,” supra note 9 at 12.
OECD, Revenue Statistics 2019 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2019) at 19.
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financial year. The deficits are quite dire, but vary across Partner States,
with Kenya reflecting a deficit of 5.6 per cent of GDP,23 while at the lower
end of the scale, Tanzania reflected a deficit of 2.3 per cent of GDP for the
same period.24 Moreover, aside from Rwanda25 and Uganda,26 most of the
Partner States failed to meet their budgeted targets for the collection of
income tax.27 As a result, Partner States like Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda
have prioritized in their budget announcements the improvement of the tax
administration in their respective countries.28
Bearing this context in mind, the corporate tax base of the six Partner
States will now be analyzed. All six Partner States employ the classical
corporate income tax system with corporate profits being taxed in the
hands of the corporate, while the distributed profits are taxed in the hands
of the shareholders as dividends. The taxable income of companies is the
result of reducing income by allowable deductions.
In terms of the definition of income, Kenya,29 Rwanda,30 Tanzania31 and
Uganda32 have a comprehensive definition of income in their respective
income tax legislation. The definition of business profits includes rental
income and investment income, with a long list of specifically included

23. Kenya, Budget Statement FY2019/20, Creating Jobs, Transforming Lives—Harnessing the ‘Big
Four’ Plan (2019) at 9, online (pdf): <www.treasury.go.ke/component/jdownloads/send/201-20192020/1442-budget-statement-for-fy-2019-20-final.html> [perma.cc/99HM-ZTB5] [Kenya Budget
Statement].
24. Tanzania, Speech by the Minister for Finance and Planning, Hon. Dr. Philip I. Mpango (MP),
Presenting to the National Assembly, the Estimates of Government Revenue and Expenditure for
2019/20 (13 June 2019) at para 32, online (pdf): <gbt.go.tz/files/documents/BudgetSpeech2019-En.
pdf> [perma.cc/M2WL-KWSP] [Tanzania Budget Speech].
25. Rwanda, Budget Speech Financial Year 2019/20: Transforming lives through Industrialization
and Job Creation for Shared Prosperity (June 2019) at para 16, online (pdf): <www.tralac.org/
documents/resources/by-country/rwanda/2862-rwanda-budget-speech-2019-20/file.html>
[perma.
cc/39D5-87FS] [Rwanda Budget Speech].
26. Uganda, Budget Speech FY2019/20: Industrialization for Job Creation and Shared Prosperity
(June 2019) at para 23, online (pdf): <budget.go.ug/content/budget-speech-7> [perma.cc/M2WLKWSP] [Uganda Budget Speech].
27. See Kenya, 2019 Budget Review and Outlook Paper (September 2019) at 15, online (pdf):
<https://www.treasury.go.ke/component/jdownloads/send/201-2019-2020/1303-the-fiscal-budgetfor-the-financial-year-2019-20.html>; Tanzania Budget Speech, supra note 24, at para 14; South
Sudan, FY: 2019/2020 Approved Budget Book (19 December 2019) at ii, online (pdf): <www.
mofep-grss.org/docs/fy-2019-2020-approved-budget-book> [perma.cc/V7UD-R7XP]; Budgetary
information for Burundi is not available.
28. Kenya Budget Statement, supra note 23 at 8; Tanzania Budget Speech, supra note 24 at paras
33-34; Uganda Budget Speech, supra note 26 at paras 111-112.
29. Income Tax Act, 1973, Chapter 470 (Kenya), s 3(2).
30. Law No.16/2018 of 13 April 2018 Establishing Taxes on Income (Rwanda), arts 19, 35, 40–43.
31. Income Tax Act, 2004 as amended, c 332 (Tanzania), ss 6–9.
32. Income Tax Act, 1997, c 340 of the Laws of Uganda (Uganda), ss 17–20.
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amounts.33 Having said that, the definition of income is rather minimal in
the fiscal legislation of Burundi34 and South Sudan.35
The general rule for the deductions is similar across Kenya,36 Tanzania37
and Uganda,38 with the requirements for an expenditure or loss to have
been incurred in the production of income. Rwanda39 and Burundi,40
however, require a more methodical approach to deductions, likely with a
view to identify real economic activity. These Partner States require that
the expenditure must be incurred for purposes related to business, must
result in the reduction of net assets, must correspond to real expenditure,
and must be related to the particular financial year. In terms of specific
deductions, a deduction for research and development related expenditure
is allowed in Burundi,41 Kenya,42 Rwanda,43 Tanzania44 and Uganda.45
Moreover, while all six Partner States allow for capital allowances and
depreciation deductions, the rates and capital projects differ across the
Partner States. Possible tax leakages may arise in this area as many of
the Partner States provide capital allowances which may be considered
excessive. For instance, all the Partner States except for Burundi and
South Sudan routinely provide for initial capital allowance rates of 50%46
while Kenya provides for a 150% capital allowance for the construction
of bulk storage and handling facilities for supporting the Standard Gauge
railway operations, provided that certain conditions are met.47
A further area for possible tax leakage lies in the rules for the carry
forward of losses across the Partner States. An indefinite carry forward of

33. The list of specifically included amounts does not appear to hamper the interpretation of income
in the EAC Partner States. For instance, see Heritage Oil and Gas Limited v Uganda Revenue Authority
[2011] UGTAT 6 and Kenya Revenue Authority v Yaya Towers Limited (2016) eKLR.
34. Law No. 1/02 of 24 January 2013 Regarding Income Taxes, (Loi No. 01/02 Du 24 Janvier 2013
Relative Aux Impots Sur Les Revenus), as amended (Burundi), art 37. This legislation is only available
in French, online (pdf) <www.assemblee.bi> [perma.cc/MG94-C52E].
35. Taxation Act, Statutes of South Sudan 2009, s 64.
36. Supra note 29, s 15(1).
37. Supra note 31, s 11(2).
38. Supra note 32, s 22(1).
39. Supra note 30, art 25.
40. Supra note 34 at art 53.
41. Ibid, art 68.
42. Supra note 29, s 15(2)(n).
43. Supra note 30, art 30.
44. Supra note 31, s 15(1).
45. Supra note 32, s 32(1).
46. Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 2020 (Kenya), Second Schedule; Law Nº 006/2021 of 05/02/2021 on
Investment Promotion And Facilitation (Rwanda), Annex item XX; supra note 31 at Third Schedule;
supra note 32, s 28(1).
47. Supra note 29, s 24E; Business Laws (Amendment) Act, 2020 (Kenya), s 11.
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losses is allowed in Tanzania48 and Uganda.49 On the other hand, Burundi,50
Kenya (in all other industries),51 Rwanda52 and South Sudan53 place a
restriction on the number of years for which a loss may be carried forward.
While the EAC region did undergo a tax rate harmonization to thirty
per cent after the production of a report on tax harmonization in the region
some years back,54 this tax rate harmonization is more of an illusion than a
reality. Now, the only Partner State that does not offer a special corporate
income tax rate for an identified sector or taxpayer is Uganda. All the other
Partner States have made significant reductions in the standard corporate
income tax rate, with South Sudan’s55 reduced rate sinking to ten per cent
for certain sectors.
However, the tax incentives offered by most Partner States have the
effect of reducing the varying tax rates to relative insignificance. The only
Partner State that does not offer corporate income tax holidays is South
Sudan, and that is because it is embroiled in political conflict. Burundi,
Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania all offer exemptions from the
payment of corporate tax. Some offer exemptions for five years and others
for ten years, as discussed further in Part II.2.b below. These tax incentives
are all offered with the aim of attracting foreign direct investment, and in
the hopes of differentiating themselves from other EAC Partner States.
While the EAC region has performed well in terms of attracting more
foreign direct investment than other countries in Africa, it is nonetheless
questionable whether the EAC would not have won such investment
without the deep cuts into the corporate tax the Partner States could have
collected.
For some companies, corporate tax is not a cost they have to bear
when doing business in the EAC Partner States. As such, in designing its
corporate income tax system, the East African Federation should consider
the role of tax incentives when determining the objectives it hopes to
achieve with its corporate income tax. The next part will discuss this

48. No provisions restricting the carry forward of losses in the Income Tax Act (Tanzania), see supra
note 31, s 19.
49. Supra note 32, s 38.
50. Supra note 34, art 75.
51. Supra note 29, s 15(4).
52. Supra note 30, art 32.
53. Supra note 35, s 78(2).
54. Hans-Goerg Petersen, ed, Tax Systems and Tax Harmonisation in the East African Community
(EAC): Report for the EAC/GTZ Program “Support to the EAC Integration Process (Potsdam:
University of Potsdam 2010).
55. Supra note 35 at Second Schedule.
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aspect of the design of a corporate income tax system for the East African
Federation, along with other relevant factors for the East African context.
2. Policy choices
Tax policy cannot be conceived in a vacuum. For tax policy to be effective,
it is necessary to take into account the social, economic and political
realities of the country in which the policy is to operate.56 From an East
African Federation perspective, therefore, it is important for corporate
income tax policies to be formulated while bearing in mind the reality in
which the policies are to operate.
To do this, it is important to identify what the East African Federation
hopes to achieve from a corporate income tax. The critical objective of the
corporate income tax in the East African Federation would be to increase
government revenues. Corporate income tax is an amenable policy tool
for achieving this revenue-raising aim. Bowler Smith notes that corporate
income tax as a regulatory instrument is cost-effective, flexible and
efficient.57 Corporate income tax is especially effective in promoting the
more efficient use of resources.58 However, as a system, the corporate
income tax does have some drawbacks. These drawbacks include
questions about the fairness of corporate income tax in taxing the income
from capital, both in the hands of the company and the shareholder,59 and
the manner in which the complexity of the corporate income tax system
distorts investment decisions.60
In practical terms, however, the great disparity between the rates of
corporate income tax to total tax across the Partner States indicates that
corporate income tax is a potential growth factor on which the East African
Federation should focus. Moreover, the fact that all of the Partner States
are presently in dire budget deficits—some are critical—adds impetus
to the need to realize the growth potential of corporate income tax. It is
therefore key that the East African Federation take measures to broaden
the tax base of corporate income tax. This could be done by evaluating
the EU’s proposed common consolidated corporate tax base and is further
discussed under part II.2.a (EU’s proposed CCCTB).
The second manner in which the corporate income tax could raise
more revenue is by ensuring that the East African Federation is competitive
56. Helen Bullock, Juliet Mountford & Rebecca Stanley, Better Policy-Making (London: Centre for
Management and Policy Studies, 2001).
57. M Bowler Smith, “Chapter 3: Corporate Tax Objectives” in The Taxing Road to Sustainable
Growth, Resource Productivity and Corporate Taxation” (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2013).
58. Ibid.
59. David L Weimer, “A Better Corporate Tax?” (2002) 21:4 J Policy Analysis & Management 693.
60. Ibid.
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within the global market. Like many other developing countries, the East
African Federation would seek to attract foreign direct investment. Tax
incentives are typically used to fulfill this function, and it is therefore
key for the East African Federation to determine whether it will use such
mechanisms and how best to use them to suit the East African context.
This will be further discussed under part II.2.b (Tax incentives).
A third manner of raising more corporate income tax is to reduce
the large informal sector in the East African region. The informal sector
here means “all economic activity—and income earned from it—that
circumvent government regulation, taxation or observation.”61 The manner
in which the East African Federation may reduce the informal sector is
discussed under part II.2.c.
a.

Broaden the corporate income tax base

The European Union’s proposed CCCTB
The idea of establishing a common corporate income tax base in the EU
has been the subject of debate for decades. It has been recognized that
the corporate income tax systems across Member States vary greatly, and
that great costs to taxpayers are involved in conducting cross-border trade
within the EU.62
The idea of developing a meaningful commonality in the corporate tax
base in the EU was first posited in 1992 by the Committee of Independent
Experts in Company Taxation (the Ruding Committee),63 followed by
further action taken in 1999 through the Council inviting the Commission
to present a study on company taxation in the EU.64 In its most recent
attempt at corporate tax commonality, the Commission first tabled its
formal proposal for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in 2011.
It proved too difficult to obtain the necessary Member State consensus to
pass the proposal, and the proposal was later replaced with a relaunched
two-part proposal in 2016. The first part of this proposal envisages a
directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base65 (CCTB proposal) to be later

61. Andreas Buehn, Roberto Dell’Anno & Friedrich Schneider, “Exploring the Dark Side of Tax
Policy: An Analysis of the Interactions between Fiscal Illusion and the Shadow Economy” (2018) 54:4
Empirical Economics 1609 at 1611.
62. Marjaana Helminen, EU Tax Law—Direct Taxation (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2018) at 4.4.1.
63. Jan van de Streek, “Chapter 11: A Common (Consolidated) Corporate Tax Base (C(C)CTB)”
in Peter J Wattèl, Otto Marres and Hein Vermeulen, eds, Terra/Wattel—European Tax Law, 7th ed
(Netherlands: Wolters Kluwer, 2018) at 29.
64. Ibid.
65. Proposal for a directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB), COM(2016)685 final
[CCTB Proposal].
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followed by a directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
(CCCTB proposal).66
The CCTB/CCCTB proposals have two general policy objectives:
encouraging growth and investment within the EU and making the
corporate income tax more fair within the EU.67 To meet the first policy
objective, Van de Streek points to several measures within the CCTB/
CCCTB proposals, including: the move to harmonize the tax base, the
super deduction for research and development for start-up companies, and
the allowance for corporate equity.68 The second objective is met through
the introduction of measures that counter cross-border tax avoidance,
including the mandatory application of the CCTB/CCCTB proposals to
groups of companies with consolidated global turnover of more than €750
million,69 and the proposed sharing mechanism in the CCCTB proposal.70
The essence of the proposal is that the taxable income of companies
and permanent establishments within the EU is to be determined
according to uniform rules applied across the Member States. Moreover,
the financial performance of group companies is to be consolidated. Such
consolidated taxable income is to be apportioned amongst the group
member companies according to an apportionment formula comprised
of the production factors, including sales, labour and capital. The taxable
income apportioned to each member of the group is to be subject to tax
at the rate determined by the Member State in which the group member
companies are operating. On a practical level, this development would
result in only one tax return being filed by the parent company of the group
on behalf of the entire group. This tax return would be filed in the Member
State in which the parent company is resident.
Determining the tax base of companies and permanent establishments
under the CCTB proposal involves determining revenues, excluding
exempt revenue, followed by the deduction of expenses.71 “Revenues” is
broadly defined in article 4(5) and includes: monetary or non-monetary
proceeds derived from a sale or any other transaction (net of value added
tax and other taxes); proceeds from the disposal of rights and assets;
interest; dividends and other profit distributions; proceeds of liquidations;
royalties; gifts received and ex gratia payments. Revenues does not,
66. Proposal for a directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2016)
683 final [CCCTB Proposal].
67. Supra note 65, preamble at para 2.
68. Supra note 63 at 432.
69. Ibid at 434-435.
70. CCCTB Proposal, supra note 66 at 2-4.
71. CCTB Proposal, supra note 65, art 7.
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however, include receipts arising from the repayment of a debt or the
raising of equity.72 Despite its inclusion in revenues, income which is to
be exempted includes: the profits of foreign permanent establishments; the
proceeds from the disposal of shares where the taxpayer has maintained
a minimum holding of ten per cent in the shareholding or voting rights
of the company during the twelve months preceding the disposal; profit
distributions from companies where the taxpayer has a minimum holding
of ten per cent in the shareholding or of the voting rights of the distributing
company for twelve consecutive months; proceeds from the disposal of
pooled assets; and subsidies directly related to the acquisition, construction
or improvement of depreciable assets.73 Moreover, while interest and
royalty income are to be subject to tax, the withholding tax paid on such
receipts are to be credited.74
Article 9 of the CCTB Proposal allows for the deduction of expenses
to the extent that they are directly incurred in the business interest of the
taxpayer. Such deductible expenses may include research and development
costs and also costs arising from the raising of debt or equity for the
purpose of business.75 The term “expenses” is further defined in article
4(6) as meaning:
decreases in net equity of the company during the accounting period in
the form of outflows or a reduction in the value of assets or in the form
of a recognition or increase in the value of liabilities, other than those
related to monetary or non-monetary distributions to shareholders or
equity owners in their capacity as such.

The CCTB Proposal allows for the super-deduction of research and
development costs by way of an additional deduction of fifty per cent of
such costs up to a maximum of €20 million and a further twenty-five per
cent deduction for costs over €20 million.76
The CCTB Proposal also includes a special research and development
deduction for “small starting companies.”77 In addition to the deduction
of research and development costs in full under article 9(2), article 9(3)
allows companies to deduct a further one hundred per cent of their research
and development costs if the following conditions are met: the company
is unlisted with fewer than 50 employees; it has an annual turnover and/

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Ibid, art 4(5).
Ibid, art 8.
Ibid, art 55.
Ibid, art 9(2).
Ibid, art 9(3).
Ibid at 10.
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or annual balance sheet total that is less than €10 million; it is not the
result of a merger; it has been registered for no longer than five years or its
economic activity has endured for a period of five years or less; and it has
no associated enterprises.78
The CCTB also attempts to work towards the elimination of the
debt-equity bias through the allowance for growth and investment. This
elimination allows for the cost of equity to be deductible in instances of
an incremental increase in equity as compared to a reference point. For the
first ten years, this reference point will be the first day of the first year of
the application of the CCTB rules.79 After ten years, the reference year is
annually moved forward one year.80 The CCTB also provides that should
there be a decrease in the equity base, an amount equal to the defined yield
calculated in terms of article 11(5) shall become taxable. The defined yield
shall be calculated with reference to the Euro Area ten-year government
benchmark bond in December of the year preceding the relevant year,
along with a risk premium increase of two percentage points.81
The CCTB continues in the calculation of the tax base by detailing a
list of non-deductible expenses in article 12. Non-deductible items include:
• profit distributions and repayments of equity or debt
• fifty per cent of entertainment costs (up to an amount still to be
determined)
• transfers of retained earnings to an equity reserve
• taxes on profits and corporate tax
• bribes and other illegal payments
• fines and penalties
• expenses incurred in the deriving of exempt income
• gifts and donations
• capital costs related to fixed assets that are deductible elsewhere
in the CCTB rules; and
• losses of a permanent establishment situated in a third country.
The CCTB Proposal further allows for losses to be carried forward
indefinitely.82
The CCCTB Proposal, on the other hand, provides the rules for the
consolidation of profits of group companies, and the allocation of such
profits across the group members operating in different Member States
according to the apportionment formula. Article 7(1) provides that the tax
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Ibid.
Ibid, art 11(4).
Ibid.
Ibid, art 11(5).
Ibid, art 41.
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bases of all group members are to be added together, while article 7(2)
states that should such consolidation result in a negative tax base, this is to
be carried forward for set-off against a positive consolidated base. Only a
positive consolidated tax base may be apportioned.
Such apportionment is set out in articles 28 to 42 and details the
formulary apportionment with its three equally weighted factors of sales,
capital and labour. The formula to determine the share of the tax base
for a particular group member (Company A) is set out in article 28(1) as
follows:83

In terms of the calculation of the above figures, the CCCTB Proposal
provides special rules for the oil and extractive industry. Article 42
states that the sales amount of the group member actually conducting
the exploration or production of oil or gas business shall be attributed
to the group member situated in the Member State where the business is
conducted. Moreover, in the event that the group member conducts the
exploration or production of oil or gas business in a third country where
such group member does not have a permanent establishment, the sales
amount arising from such business shall nonetheless be attributed to such
group member.84 However, should there be no group member situated
in the Member State where the exploration or production of oil or gas
business is conducted, the sales amount is to be attributed to all the other
group members in proportion to their labour and assets factors.85
Once the consolidated tax base has been apportioned in terms of
the above formula, article 45 provides that such apportioned tax base
is to be subject to tax according to the varying tax rates of the Member
States involved. Administrative provisions are set out in articles 46 to 68,
including details such as the notice to form a group and the information that
is to be included in such notice, the obligation of the principal taxpayer to
file the consolidated return, the information to be included in such return,
the failure to file a tax return, and the procedures to follow should a dispute
arise between the Member State and taxpayer.
More recently in May 2018, the Commission proposed that once
the relevant CCCTB legislation is in place, a three per cent call rate
should be applied to the CCCTB to bolster the EU’s own resources.86 In
83.
84.
85.
86.

CCCTB Proposal, supra note 66, art 28(1).
Ibid, art 42.
Ibid, arts 38(4)-(5), 42.
European Commission, EU Budget: Commission Proposes A Modern Budget for a Union that
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March 2018, the European Parliament passed a resolution that approved
recommendations to the CCCTB Proposal, as proposed by the Economic
and Monetary Affairs Committee.87 These recommendations include:
(i)
The introduction of a fourth factor, the data factor, to the formulary
apportionment;
(ii) While initially the CCCTB should be mandatory for groups of a
certain size, this threshold should be lowered to zero over seven
years;
(iii) The introduction of a digital permanent establishment concept;
(iv) Losses in respect of a consolidated tax base shall be carried forward
for a period of five years;
(v) A compensation mechanism shall be introduced to weather the
transitional sudden shock to tax revenues of Member States that
implement the CCCTB. This mechanism is to be financed by the
fiscal surpluses of Member States to experience gains in fiscal
revenues. This mechanism is to remain in place for an initial period
of seven years;
(vi) As a transitional measure, the Commission is to draft guidelines on
how the formulary apportionment method may co-exist with other
allocation methods employed by the non-EU States;
(vii) A dispute resolution mechanism should be put in place when the
formulary apportionment produces a result that does not fit the
actual economic activity;
(viii) The CCCTB should be implemented in one step. If the Council fails
to reach unanimous consensus on this, article 116 of the TFEU88
should be invoked. This means that the European Parliament and
the Council should act under the ordinary legislation procedure.89 As
a last resort, the enhanced cooperation procedures may be used by
Member States wishing to participate in the implementation of the
CCCTB;

Protects, Empowers And Defends (2 May 2018).
87. European Parliament, European Parliament legislative resolution of 15 March 2018 on
the proposal for a Council directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB)
(COM(2016)0683–C8-0471/2016–2016/0336(CNS)) (15 March 2018).
88. Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), article
116, OJEU C 326/47 (2012), EU Law IBFD.
89. The ordinary legislative procedure allows for the European Parliament and the Council to jointly
decide on the proposals for law made by the Commission (the only body which may initiate legislative
proposals). The vast majority of European laws are passed in this way. However, in respect of taxation,
the special legislative procedures are to be followed which means that the European Parliament is only
able to provide an advisory opinion on the legislative proposal while the Council, acting unanimously,
is to make the decision whether to accept, reject or amend the Commission’s legislative proposal.
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(ix)

The CCCTB regime is to be evaluated by an interparliamentary
conference and the European Parliament shall report its findings
to the Commission and the Council. Moreover, five years after
the implementation of the CCCTB, the Commission is to conduct
an assessment of its implementation and report to the European
Parliament and the Council;
(x) The provisions are to apply from 1 January 2020.
The recent proposed recommendations to the CCCTB Proposal
indicate a more decisive approach than those proposed in the two-part
CCTB/CCCTB proposals. A compensation mechanism is a novel way to
ensure that arguments cannot be raised of a loss to revenues as a result of
the implementation of the CCCTB. Moreover, the recommendation of the
CCCTB to take into account the digital economy is a necessary change to
make the CCCTB more relevant to modern reality.
The recommendations indicate an awareness of the possibility of
factor manipulation of the formulary apportionment by the provision
acknowledging that the formulary apportionment method may result in an
outcome that does not match the economic activity actually undertaken.
To overcome this result, the amendments propose that this be resolved
through a dispute resolution mechanism. While this proposal is not ideal
because one would prefer that mechanisms be put in place to ensure that
the workings of the formulary apportionment mirrors the economic reality,
the proposed resolution of disputes via dispute resolution is a workable
solution under the circumstances.
Moreover, it is a prudent measure to have the CCCTB regime and its
implementation evaluated to determine whether the policy objectives of
the CCCTB are being achieved. Most importantly, the recommendations
include a planned way forward in the event of the Council failing to reach
consensus on the CCTB/CCCTB Proposals. In the author’s view, this is a
bold step forward towards making the CCCTB a reality.
The CCTB/CCCTB Proposals and their predecessors have been the
subject of much criticism.90 While the recent amendments to the CCTB/
90. See e.g. Jeanette C Borg, “The Tax Treatment of Losses under the Proposed Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Directive” (2013) 41:11 Intertax 581; Maarten F De Wilde, “Tax
Competition within the European Union – Is the CCCTB Directive a Solution?” (2014) 7:1 Erasmus
L Rev 24; Monica Erasmus-Koen, “Common Consolidated Tax Base: A Fair Share of the Tax Base?”
(2011) 18:4 Intl Transfer Pricing J 245; Eric CCM Kemmeren, “CCCTB: Enhanced Speed Ahead
for Improvement” (2011) 20:5 EC Tax Rev 208; Erik Röder, “Proposal for an Enhanced CCTB as
Alternative to a CCCTB with Formulary Apportionment” (2012) 4:2 World Tax J 125; Marc Temme,
Eduard Sporken & Rezan Okten, “Why Re-Invent the Wheel in the European Union? The Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Proposal” (2011) 18:5 Intl Transfer Pricing J 330; Edoardo
Traversa & Charles-Albert Helleputte, “Taxation of EU-resident companies under the current CCCTB
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CCCTB Proposals would address some of the criticisms levelled against the
CCCTB concept, particularly the concern that the CCCTB fails to cater to
the digital economy, some of the broader criticisms remain. These criticisms
include that Member States will lose their tax sovereignty over corporate
tax;91 that the formula remains unbalanced;92 that there is no compensation
for minority shareholders of individual group companies involved in the
consolidation;93 and the fact that multinational companies could still locate
the formulary apportionment factors in low-tax jurisdictions.94 Moreover,
concern has been raised that the AGI may be counter-productive in
encouraging the raising of equity because an additional tax liability would
arise in the event of equity decreases.95 Spengel and others argue that a
“pure” allowance for corporate equity would have had decreases in equity
merely to attract a lower equity allowance rather than an additional tax
burden.96 A detailed discussion of these concerns are beyond the scope of
this paper, and have been discussed elsewhere.97
Recommendations
From an East African Federation perspective, the CCCTB Proposal and
its recommendations offer the East African Federation the opportunity to
align and simplify the varied corporate tax bases of the Partner States. To
do this effectively, it is advisable for the CCCTB-like system to apply to
all companies operating within the East African Federation.
Furthermore, the East African Federation may find the comprehensive
definition of revenues in article 4 of the CCTB Proposal useful given that
South Sudan, for instance, has a minimal definition of income or revenue.98
Framework: Descriptive and Critical Approach to Selected ‘Extraterritorial’ Aspects” in Michael
Lang, ed, Corporate Income Taxation in Europe: The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
and Third Countries (United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 2013); Marius Vascega & Servaas van Thiel,
“The CCCTB Proposal: The Next Step towards Corporate Tax Harmonization in the European Union”
(2011) 51:9/10 EuroTax 379.
91. Vascega & van Thiel, supra note 90; Maarten F de Wilde, “Chapter 2: The CCCTB Relaunch: A
Critical Assessment and Some Suggestions for Modification” in Pasquale Pistone, ed, European Tax
Integration: Law, Policy and Politics (Online Books: IBFD, 2018).
92. Vascega & van Thiel, supra note 90.
93. Borg, supra note 90.
94. De Wilde, supra note 91; Leon Bettendorf et al., “Corporate Tax Reform in the EU: Weighing
Pros and Cons” (2011) at 3, online (pdf): Academia <academia.edu/1427439/Corporate_Tax_Reform_
in_the_EU_Weighing_Pros_and_Cons> [perma.cc/B3WE-Y8JW].
95. Christopher Spengel et al, “Addressing the Debt-Equity Bias within a Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) – Possibilities, Impact on Effective Tax Rates and Revenue Neutrality”
(2018) 10:2 World Tax J 165 at 171.
96. Ibid.
97. Afton Titus, “How Can the East African Community Guard Against Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting While Working Towards Deeper Integration?” (2017) 9:4 World Tax J 565.
98. The Taxation Act (South Sudan), 2009, s 64.
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According to section 64 of the Taxation Act in South Sudan, gross income
means “all income earned or accrued, including, but not limited to,
income from production, trade, financial investment, professional or other
economic activities within the tax period.”99 These categories are broad,
and the CCTB definition of “revenues” would clarify the exact scope of
income that falls within the tax base.
Moreover, the CCTB Proposal’s definition of expenses in article 4
ties in with the definition adopted in Rwanda and Burundi, which focuses
on the objective indicators of an expense, such as the reduction of asset
values or a decrease in net equity.100 Rwanda’s Law Establishing Taxes on
Income, for instance, provides at article 25 that expenses may be deducted
if the following conditions are met: the expenses are directly chargeable to
income and are directly incurred for the purpose of business; the expenses
are real expenses that can be substantiated with proper documentation; the
expenses result in a decrease in net assets; and the expenses are incurred
in the same tax year as the activities to which they relate.101
All of the Partner States already account for research and development
deductions in full in the year in which they are incurred.102 Therefore, the
deduction for such expenditure under the CCTB Proposal would not be
out of place within the East African Federation. However, the extent of the
deduction would have to be carefully considered by the Federation as to
whether it should allow a super-deduction for research and development,
as the CCTB Proposal has done. Given that a super-deduction has not been
a trend in the East African region and that such a super-deduction would
narrow the tax base (albeit in a bid to encourage research and development
in the region), it is recommended that the East African Federation not
incorporate a super-deduction immediately upon the implementation of
its corporate income tax system. The East African Federation may wish to
revisit this decision after some years once its corporate income tax system
has been in place for a number of years.
Having said that, there is a point of similarity between the allowances
offered under the CCTB Proposal and Uganda’s income tax laws for
small, start-up companies. While the CCTB Proposal offers a research and
development super-deduction of one hundred per cent of relevant costs
99. Ibid.
100. Law Regarding Income Taxes (Burundi), 2013, art 53; Law Establishing Taxes on Income
(Rwanda), 2018, art 25.
101. Law Establishing Taxes on Income (Rwanda), 2018, art 25.
102. Law Regarding Income Taxes (Burundi), 2013, art 68; Income Tax Act, 1973 (Kenya), 1973,
s 15(2)(n); Law Establishing Taxes on Income (Rwanda), 2018, art 30; Income Tax Act (Tanzania),
2004, s 15(1); Income Tax Act (Uganda), 1997, s 32(1).

Domestic Revenue Mobilization through Corporate Income
Tax in an East African Developing Country Context

171

for small companies that meet the specified requirements under article
9(3), Uganda offers a deduction of twenty-five per cent per annum for four
years of the costs incurred in starting up a business to produce income.103
While the CCTB Proposal deduction allows for a greater amount of
qualifying expenditure to be deducted, Uganda’s deduction allows for a
broader spectrum of expenditures to be deducted other than just research
and development expenditures. To encourage the development of small
business, it is recommended that the East African Federation incorporate
a deduction for small, start-up companies similar to that implemented
in Uganda. It would be more feasible to encourage the growth of small
business in industry broadly in the East African Federation rather than just
in the one that incurs research and development expenditures.
The CCTB Proposal would also allow the East African Federation to
create unity across its corporate income tax base by aligning the varying
rates of depreciation allowed within the Partner States.104 Moreover,
the CCTB Proposal offers the East African Federation the opportunity
to create more symmetry across the tax treatment of debt and equity
through its Allowance for Growth and Investment (AGI). Should the East
African Federation implement provisions similar to the AGI in the CCTB
Proposal, it would allow the Federation to move towards the elimination
of the debt-equity bias in the tax treatment of interest and equity. An AGI
may also encourage more taxpayers to incorporate companies, which
would increase the number of taxpayers subject to corporate income tax
in the Federation. It is therefore advisable for the East African Federation
to consider implementing an AGI-like provision in its corporate income
tax system. It is not recommended that the Federation follow the CCTB
Proposal in determining that decreases in equity should result in a further
tax liability for the taxpayer company. Such a provision would likely deter
taxpayers from forming companies.
In terms of the consolidation aspect proposed in the CCCTB Proposal,
it would be particularly useful to the East African Federation because
it would enable it to deal more effectively with situations of corporate
failures. One of the reasons for the dismantling of a previous regional
integration attempt in the East African region was the lack of participation

103. Income Tax Act (Uganda), 1997, s 30.
104. There are differences in depreciation rates implemented in the Partner States. For instance,
industrial buildings depreciate at a rate of twenty per cent per annum in Uganda (Income Tax Act
(Uganda), 1997, Sixth Schedule, Part 1) while Rwanda and Tanzania use a rate of five per cent per
annum (Law Establishing Taxes on Income (Rwanda), 2018, art 28; Income Tax Act (Tanzania), 2004,
Third Schedule, item 3(6)).
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of other Partner States when a corporate failed.105 It was left to one Partner
State, the country in which the entity was registered, to account for and
deal with the consequences of a corporate failure. If the East African
Federation were to implement a system similar to the CCCTB, it would
mean that, in the event that the group realizes a loss, such loss would
result in no tax being paid by the group. Such loss would then be allowed
to be carried forward to the next year in a coordinated fashion until the
group is once again profitable. It is more likely that a group would turn
a profit at some point in the future than a single company. Therefore, the
East African Federation would more likely be in a position to receive the
group’s tax portion in a shorter time once the group is again profitable than
would be the case if one Partner State were waiting for a single company
operating within its borders to turn its losses into profits.
It is important, however, that the carry forward of losses be limited to
encourage the group’s return to profitability. As many of the Partner States
already limit the carry forward of losses,106 the similar provision in the
most recent recommendations to the CCCTB Proposal would work well
within the East African Federation.
The purpose of applying an apportionment-like formula in the East
African Federation would be to allow the corporate income tax collected
at the Federal Government level to be redistributed to the Constituent
States (which the EAC Partner States will become once the Federation is
formed) according to the operations conducted there by the group company
members. Redistribution on such terms would foster more efficiency
amongst the Constituent States because apportionment would incentivize
Constituent States to find non-tax related reasons to encourage companies
to operate within their province. Having said that, an apportionment based
only on the location of group company operations may result in the lesser
developed Constituent States being in a worse off position than their more
developed Constituent States, as companies would be more inclined to
operate from the more developed Constituent State.
To avoid the least developed Constituent States from losing out on an
allocation of the corporate income tax, it is proposed that the East African
Federation supplement the apportionment formula with a macro-economic
element that is tied to the GDP of the Member States, as suggested by

105. DAK Mbogoro, “The East African Community: An Economic Analysis of the Integration
Scheme” (1978) 8:1/2 African Rev 55 at 61.
106. Law Regarding Income Taxes (Burundi), 2013, art 75; Income Tax Act, 1973 (Kenya), 1973, s
15(4); Law Establishing Taxes on Income (Rwanda), 2018, art 32; The Taxation Act (South Sudan),
2009, s 78(2).
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Kellerman and others.107 A macro-economic element would address the
need to ensure regional development through redistributing resources to
the Constituent States who need it most. In practical terms, this means
that a portion of the tax base calculated by an application of the CCCTB
rules would be retained and then redistributed to all Constituent States,
irrespective of whether such Constituent State has any tie to the companies
involved. The amount each Constituent State is to receive from such
distributed tax base would depend on the Constituent State’s GDP.108
Constituent States with the lowest GDP would receive a greater proportion
of the retained and redistributed tax base.109
In an East African Federation context, this would mean that each of
the Constituent States of the East African Federation would always receive
a portion of the tax base collected through a system similar to the CCCTB.
For example, where a group has located its factors in the Constituent
States formerly known as Kenya and Uganda, the majority of the CCCTB
tax base would be allocated to the Constituent States formerly known as
Kenya and Uganda because they are the Constituent States housing the
apportionment factors—let’s say an allocation of seventy per cent. The
other thirty per cent of the tax base would accordingly be divided amongst
all the Constituent States, with the lowest GDP-generating Constituent
State receiving the largest portion of the redistributed thirty per cent tax
base. Such redistribution would allow the less developed Constituent
States, such as the Constituent States formerly known as South Sudan
and Burundi, the opportunity and the means to catch up with the more
developed Constituent States in the East African Federation.
In terms of the above discussion, it is envisaged that the total
corporate income tax collected at the Federal Government level would be
redistributed to the Constituent States. This is based on the understanding
that the Federal Government would be funded by other taxes, such as
personal income taxes, value-added tax and/or property taxes.
The East African Federation would not be hindered by some of the
political sensitivities that surround the Member States. Therefore, it
would be possible for it to implement a regime similar to the CCCTB
in one phase and also to have the regime apply to all companies and
permanent establishments within the East African Federation. Moreover,
it is recommended that the East African Federation emulate the checks to
107. Christian Kellerman, Thomas Rixen & Susanne Uhl, “Europeanizing Corporate Taxation
to Regain National Tax Policy Autonomy” (2007) at 3, online (pdf): International Policy Analysis
<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/04760.pdf > [perma.cc/3XA6-6ABS]
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
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be built into the CCCTB regime, as proposed in the recommendations, to
ensure that the CCCTB regime achieves the objectives it is intended to
bring about.
It is questionable whether the East African Federation should consider
implementing the data factor and the concept of a digital permanent
establishment. Such implementation would certainly place the Federation
at the vanguard of navigating the digital economy and all its implications
for the effective taxation of corporate profits. However, the author has
some concern that including this digital component would complicate
the implementation of a CCCTB regime to the extent that more resources
would be devoted to the complexities of a CCCTB at the expense of
implementing the simpler aspects well. The author therefore suggests that
the East African Federation initially implement the three-factor formulary
apportionment, with the digital components to be introduced later after it
has settled into implementing and administering a CCCTB system.
In making this suggestion, the author is aware of the growing
importance of the service industry within the East African region and of the
forecast that the service industry will constitute 51.3 per cent of the EAC’s
GDP by 2050.110 The figures suggest that the East African Federation
must therefore account for intangibles at some point. The author is of
the view that notwithstanding the projected importance of intangibles
to the East African Federation, it would have much more to gain from
a prudent, staggered approach to a CCCTB regime implementation than
an “everything-at-once” approach, for which the East African Federation
may not yet have the institutional capacity to support.
The East African Federation should seriously consider implementing
a regime similar to the CCCTB proposed in the EU. This implementation
would allow the East African Federation to replace the varied corporate tax
bases across the Partner States with a system that has some synergies with
the existing corporate income tax bases of the Partner States, while allowing
it to make some difficult decisions in reforming the corporate income tax
regime in the Federation. It is encouraged that difficult decisions be made,
such as substantially narrowing the number of capital and depreciation
allowances on offer in the Partner States and implementing one corporate
income tax rate. Overall, the CCCTB regime, even in its proposed form,
holds a great deal of promise for the East African Federation.

110. East African Community, “East African Community Vision 2050: Regional Vision for SocioEconomic Transformation and Development” (2015), online (pdf): EAC Information Repository
<repository.eac.int/handle/11671/567> [http://hdl.handle.net11671/567].
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b. Attract foreign direct investment
Tax incentives

Tax incentives are commonly used in developing countries. The
principal aim of these incentives is to attract foreign direct investment.
However, there is great debate (and uncertainty) about whether tax
incentives in fact serve to increase foreign direct investment and
thereby increase economic growth.111
Despite the doubt in the true efficacy of tax incentives, tax incentives
feature strongly in the tax policies of the EAC Partner States. Kenya offers
corporate income tax holidays under both its Special Economic Zones Act
(SEZ Act)112 and its Export Processing Zones Act (EPZ Act).113 Uganda
offers exporters an exemption from income tax for a period of ten years if
certain conditions are met, including that the exporter export at least eighty
per cent of the completed goods.114 Rwanda offers a corporate income tax
holiday in its headquarter company regime.115
Recommendations
In light of the doubts as to whether tax incentives actually do bring in
greater foreign direct investment, it is recommended that the East African
Federation carefully consider whether to make use of tax incentives.
In making this decision, it would be useful to evaluate whether the tax
incentives used in the EAC Partner States were effective in meeting the
objective of attracting foreign direct investment. This evaluation should
weigh the incoming foreign direct investment against the cost of corporate
income tax not collected from the qualifying taxpayers.
In the event that such evaluation produces the decision that
tax incentives should be used in the East African Federation, it is
recommended that the East African Federation consider making use of tax

111. Marios B Obwona, “Determinants of FDI and Their Impact on Economic Growth in Uganda”
(2001) 13:1 African Development Rev 46 at 59; Rachel L Wellhausen, “Innovation in Tow: R&D FDI
and Investment Incentives” (2013) 15:4 Bus & Politics 467; Franklin R Root & Ahmed A Ahmed,
“The Influence of Policy Instruments on Manufacturing Direct Foreign Investment in Developing
Countries” (1978) 9:3 J Intl Bus Studies 81; Alexander Klemm & Stefan Van Parys, Empirical
Evidence on the Effects of Tax Incentives (2009) (IMF, 2009); Eric M Zolt, “Tax Incentives: Protecting
the Tax Base” in Alexander Trepelkov, Harry Tonino & Dominika Halka, United Nations Handbook
on Selected Issues in Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries, 2nd ed (United Nations, 2015)
451 at 452.
112. Special Economic Zones Act (Kenya), No 16 of 2015.
113. Export Processing Zones Act (Kenya), c 517.
114. Income Tax Act (Uganda), 1997, s 21(1)(y).
115. Law Nº 006/2021 Of 05/02/2021 on Investment Promotion and Facilitation (Rwanda), Annex
item I.
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credit accounts116 rather than the traditional tax holiday model. According
to Tanzi and Zee, tax credit accounts grant each qualifying investor a set
amount of tax relief, such as US$250 000 for example, against which
such investor’s actual tax liability would be set off.117 For instance, in year
one, after the investor files a tax return and its tax liability in that year
amounts to US$50 000, the investor’s tax credit account would be reduced
to US$200 000 for the subsequent years.118 This method allows for greater
certainty for the taxpayer and the revenue service while also allowing for
the tax incentive to be managed in an open and transparent manner.119
Moreover, this method would allow the East African Federation to have a
better sense of the exact cost of the corporate tax revenues it is losing to
attract foreign direct investment.
Uganda has been monitoring some of its tax incentives on a basis
similar to the tax credit account. In terms of section 166(2) of the Income
Tax Act in Uganda, companies benefitting from tax holiday periods are
nonetheless required to submit their tax computations as though they were
not exempt from tax.120 The East African Federation would therefore be
able to draw from the Ugandan experience in administering a tax credit
account-like system.
It is also recommended that the East African Federation focus on
creating non-tax reasons for investors to invest in the region. One of
these non-tax reasons should include creating a favourable investment
environment for investors, as it has been noted that such an environment
is directly related to ensuring the efficacy of any tax incentives offered.121
Moreover, the budget of the East African Federation should focus on
building infrastructure while the executive should focus on relaxing the
bureaucracy around conducting business in the region. A further means of
attracting foreign investment is through making the capital market more
open and allowing for a greater mobility of capital.122 Through a careful
and targeted devotion of resources, the Federation could easily create an
attractive destination for foreign investment—all without surrendering its
tax base.

116. See Vito Tanzi & Howell H Zee, Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: Developing Countries (IMF,
2000).
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid; Zolt, supra note 111 at 474.
120. Income Tax Act (Uganda), 1997, s 166(2).
121. Ibid at 456.
122. Paul L Baker, “An Analysis of the Corporate Income Tax Policy of Less Developed Countries”
(2018) 120:2 Scandinavian J Economics 400 at 414.
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c. Corporate income tax and the informal sector

The size of the informal sector or shadow economy is particularly
problematic. A large informal sector has the effect of substantially
narrowing the tax base to a small group of formal taxpayers.123 This, in
turn, results in low income tax rates as the government fears that higher
rates would force more taxpayers into the informal sector and out of
the government’s range.124 A study conducted by Waseem indicates that
informality remains one of the biggest barriers to emerging economies
developing better fiscal capacity.125 According to Buehn et al, these large
informal sectors in developing countries are the product of high tax
burdens.126
Mitra argues that there are two ways to reduce the size of a large
informal sector: improve tax enforcement and increase the formal sector’s
access to credit.127 Once the enforcement and administrative capacity
of revenue authorities are significantly improved, Mitra argues that this
corresponds to a significantly increased risk of errant taxpayers being
caught and penalized.128 Similarly, greater access to quality sources of
finance for the formal sector acts as an incentive for businesses to migrate
from the informal to the formal sector.129 Mitra’s study also produces the
interesting result that once these factors are present in the economy, the
link between the raising of taxes and the rise of the informal sector is
broken.130 These two factors therefore enable government to actually raise
taxes without a consequent increase in the size of the informal sector.131
Recommendations
In the light of the above discussion, the East African Federation would be
well advised to devote resources towards the significant improvement of
the administrative and enforcement capacity of its revenue authority. The
East African Federation should also work towards improving the quality
and capacity of the credit market and credit institutions. This could be done
through making more government funding available for credit institutions
and devoting more resources into developing the micro-lending market
123. Mazhar Waseem, “Taxes, Informality and Income-Shifting: Evidence from a Recent Pakistani
Tax” (2018) 157 J Public Economics 41.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid at 57.
126. Buehn, Dell’Anno & Schneider, supra note 61 at 1627.
127. Shalini Mitra, “To Tax or Not to Tax? When Does It Matter for Informality?” (2017) 64 Economic
Modelling 117.
128. Ibid at 118.
129. Ibid.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
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and suppliers within the East African region. In doing so, however, the
East African Federation should not forget to also increase the regulation
around the provision of credit so as to protect vulnerable debtors from
unscrupulous debt-collection mechanisms. Should it devote the necessary
resources in this targeted way, there is great potential for the Federation to
substantially increase its corporate income tax collections.
3. Administrative Capacity Issues
It is envisaged that administrative capacity within the East African region
should improve once the formation of the Federation pools the government
personnel. It is possible that some staff from one Partner State may be more
expert in one area while others may be more expert in another. It would
therefore be possible for internal training measures to be adopted to bring
all government officials to a certain minimum level of expertise. Beyond
that level, perhaps the East African Federation should consider bringing in
experts to train staff. The OECD is also making “toolkits” available that
may assist the East African Federation in developing its expertise in the
relevant fields.
Moreover, it is suggested that a central database of taxpayers be
formed so that each Constituent State authority may have easy access
to all relevant information pertaining to a taxpayer operating within its
province. This database may include details of the taxpayer, including
incorporation details, details of shareholders or owners and perhaps
stakeholders, location of operations, history of filed tax returns, history
of audits conducted and the outcomes thereof, and financial records of the
taxpayer if available. This central database may also be used to coordinate
audits across local government authorities regarding a taxpayer operating
in more than one region.
The formation of such a database would be facilitated by the East African
Federation implementing the OECD’s BEPS Action 13, which requires
Country-by-Country Reports to be filed by multinational enterprises
operating across several jurisdictions.132 Moreover, the Federation should
consider signing treaties that would facilitate cooperation amongst
revenue authorities to access taxpayer information. Such treaties include
Tax Exchange Information Agreements, DTAs, which include automatic
exchange of information provisions, and the Multilateral Convention on
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters,133 of which Kenya and
Uganda are signatories.
132. OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, Action 13 - 2015
Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, (Paris: OECD, 2015).
133. OECD and Council of Europe, The Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance
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In a similar fashion, the East African Federation should consider
developing a protocol for the collection of taxes owed. This protocol should
clearly set out the progression of tax collection methods to ensure that
all taxpayers in the East African region are afforded the same treatment.
Such progression may include notices of taxes due, the imposition of
penalties and interest, the point at which judgment should be sought
against a recalcitrant taxpayer, when garnishee orders should be sought,
and when third parties (such as banks) may be enlisted to seize funds
directly from taxpayer accounts. It is also suggested that such protocols
be made publicly available so that taxpayers are aware of the collection
mechanisms available to the East African Federation’s tax authority.
It is further suggested that the East African Federation pass legislation
specifically addressing the tax administration measures to be implemented
within the region. This legislation should bear in mind that an appropriate
balance should be sought between the rights of the taxpayer and that of the
East African Federation’s revenue authority.
The process of building administrative capacity cannot be completed
overnight, and the creation of a strong administrative network should
remain a longstanding item on the agenda of the East African Federation.
Conclusion
For an African developing country to achieve its SDGs, it is vital that it
mobilize domestic financial resources to finance the expenditure required
to make the SDGs a reality. This paper argues that for the proposed East
African Federation, corporate income tax may be a significant tool for
acquiring such financial resources.
This paper further argues that the corporate income tax system may
significantly increase the financial resources of the EAC Partner States
in three ways: (i) broadening the corporate income tax base according to
the rules proposed in the EU’s CCTB/CCCTB proposal; (ii) effectively
using tax incentives by identifying concrete objectives to be achieved and
monitoring the revenues lost by implementing such incentives; and (iii)
taking measures to reduce the large informal sector in the region through
increasing access to finance for formal businesses and developing an
effective tax administrative authority.
Although premised on a fictional supranational organization, this
paper has present-day value. It proposes how an African regional
integration project may offer possible solutions to the rest of the world on
how to successfully integrate several corporate income tax bases into one
in Tax Matters: Amended by the 2010 Protocol (Paris: OECD, 2011).
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coherent and functioning tax base, while properly balancing policy with
the real-world factors that influence its implementation.

